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DOOR: FINDING A HOME FOR PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND
INPUT
Dorothy D. Nachman
INTRODUCTION

In the latter part of the 2 0th century, city and regional planners
sought to identify alternatives to the urban sprawl experienced in
many American cities. This movement, known as New Urbanism or,
alternatively, Smart Growth, focuses on creating neighborhoods and
communities that integrate societal needs, environmental impacts,
economic development and livable communities. Although smart
growth concepts can enrich new developments or redeveloped areas,
they do not necessary protect existing, adjacent neighborhoods that
may be negatively impacted by the smart growth redevelopment.
Municipalities across the country have adopted zoning ordinances
that attempt to balance the benefits of new urbanism while protecting
the property interests of existing landowners.
This Article looks at the prevailing land use tools that seek to
address the concerns of existing homeowners living in the midst of
redevelopment, without stifling the smart growth principals embraced
by comprehensive plans of many local governments. In considering
which tool or tools to use to promote smart communities while
preserving the nature and characteristics of long-standing
neighborhoods, the role of community input and enforcement are of
primary concern. This Article compares private restricted covenants,
conservation zoning overlays and development agreements as three
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possible mechanisms for incorporating smart growth, mixed use
development without sacrificing existing, healthy and wellestablished neighborhoods.
I. SMART GROWTH/NEW URBANISM

New urbanism was first identified in the late 1970s2 and the
leading organization promoting new urbanism is The Congress for
the New Urbanism (CNU).
In their simplest form, the primary
principals advocated by CNU are "walkable, mixed use
neighborhood development, sustainable communities and healthier
living conditions."# More detailed in their charter, CNU advocates:
the restructuring of public policy and development
...
practices
to
support
the following
principles:
neighborhoods should be diverse in use and population
communities should be designed for the pedestrian and
transit as well as the car; cities and towns should be shaped
by physically defined and universally accessible public
spaces and community institutions urban places should be
framed by architecture and landscape design that celebrate
local history, climate, ecology, and building practice. 5
Although new urbanism was initially accomplished in greenfield
developments, its principles have increasingly been adopted in
grayfield developments and infill projects. The most common
response to new urbanism is the mixed use development which

2. Brian W. Ohm & Robert J. Sitkowski, The Influence of New Urbanisim on
Local Ordinances: The Twilight ofZoning?, 35 URB. LAw. 783, 783 (2003).
3. What is CNU?, THE CONG. FOR THE NEW URBANISM, http://www.cnu.org/

who we are (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
4. Id.
5. Charter qf the New Urbanism, THE CONG. FOR THE NEW URBANISM 1,
http://"'www.cnu.org/sites /www.cnu.org/files/cnu-charter2010_0.pdf. (last visited
Dec. 20, 2011).
6. Thomas H. Sander, Social Capital and New Urbanism: Leading a Civic
Horse to Water?, 91 NAT'L CIvic REv. 213, 215 (2002) (defining "greenfield" as
"undeveloped suburban or rural land;" "Grayfield" "as in converting a mall or
industrial plant tract into a New Urbanist development.").
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typically includes residential, commercial, office, industrial, and
recreational uses.
Such smart growth principals are largely incompatible with
existing Euclidean zoning8 that divides land into single use districts
and fails to provide sufficient flexibility for the mixed use
development that is at the heart of new urbanism.9 Local
governments that want to embrace and support the principals of new
urbanism must amend their zoning ordinances to incorporate these
principles.10 A wholesale rewrite of the entire zoning ordinance that
is sensitive to the design requirements of new urbanism is one
approach," while other local governments may adopt new
development tools and restrictions in addition to the existing zoning
ordinances to diversify the possibilities for new and re-development
projects.12 In the latter approach, the new codes co-exist with the
original ones forming an overlay district.1 3 Particularly difficult is
finding a land use planning tool to which a developer will submit his
new development that also provides sufficient opportunity for public
input and discourse.
II. PRIVATE RULES - COVENANTED SUBDIVISIONS

Private Covenanted Subdivisions
The private covenanted subdivision, or common interest
community, has been around for decades as a mechanism for
controlling land use in neighborhoods and private developments. In
1962, there were approximately 500 private covenanted

7. Wayne S. Hyatt, Lawyers in Wonderland: Opportunities Through the
Common Interest Looking Glass, in 7 ACREL Papers 5, 30 (Alan J. Robin, ed.
1995).

8. See generally infra Part I.A. 1.
9. Ohm & Sitkowski, supra note 2, at 785.
10. Id at 788.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 789.
13. Id. at 790 (citing Andres Duany & Emily Talen, New Urbanisn and Smart
Growth: Making the Good Easy: The Smart Code Alternative, 29 FORDHAvM URB.
L.J. 1445, 1466 (2002)). The Smart Code is available at www.cnu.org/node/2645.
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communities 14 and by 2010, there over 309,600 private comnunities
encompassing 24.8 million housing units across America.' 5
Typically, these covenants are prepared initially by the developer of
the project and are filed with the register of deeds prior to the initial
homesite sale in the development.' 6 Once filed, the declaration of
covenants is binding on all current and future property owners, and
anyone who purchases a home in the community is subject to the
covenants.17 Most covenants seek to provide increased community
security, 8 street maintenance, green space, community buildings,
and curbside trash collection; regulate the types of homes and extent
of occupancy that may occur, the design of additional or renovated
portions of the home, and other land use rules customarily associated
with a municipality's design review process and provision of
*19
sen ices.
Typically, a homeowners' association (HOA) is charged with the
maintenance and upkeep of the common areas of the community and
the collection and distribution of the HOA's dues. The HOA's dues
are the primary source for paying for maintenance of the common
areas.20 Each homeowner, upon purchasing his or her home,
automatically becomes a member of the HOA. Homeowners pay an
assessment equal to their proportional ownership interest in the
community. These assessments are the sole source of income to the

HOA.21
14. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697,
711 (2010); Cf id. n.68 ("This number may be an underestimate.").
15. COMMUNITY

ASSOCIATIONS

INSTITUTE,

INDUSTRY

DATA:

NATIONAL

http:/ /iwww.caionline.org/info/researchiPages/default.aspx/info/
STATISTICS,
research Pages/default.aspx (last visited December 20, 2011).
16. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 712.
17. Steven Siegel, A New Paradigm for Common Interest Communities:
Reforming Community Associations Through the Adoption of Model Governing
Documents that Reject Intricate Rule-Bound Legal Boilerplate in Favor of Clarity,
Transparency andAccountability, 40 REAL EST. L.J. 27, 35 (2011).
18. Christopher Baum, The Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Common Interest Development Disputes, 84 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 907, 910 (2010).
19. Siegel, supra note 17, at 31.
20. Rachel Furman, Collecting Unpaid Assessments: The Homeowner
Association's Dilemma When Foreclosure is No Longer a iable Option, 19 J.L. &
POL'Y 751, 754 (2011).
21. Id.
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Although private communities should be able to retroactively form
private homeowners' associations and covenants, this idea has not
taken hold. 2 The differing voices of existing neighbors represent
one challenge that confronts an existing neighborhood seeking to
retroactively adopt binding covenants. Individual homeowners have
conflicting opinions about the purpose of the neighborhood, the value
of individual property rights, and to what degree limitations should
be placed on private property uses. 23 The retroactive adoption of a
set of restrictive covenants would require the consent of each existing
homeowner in order to bind future homeowners. If one or more
existing homeowners objects to the proposed covenant and refuses to
be bound, it largely defeats the purpose of covenants seeking to
control land use. Thus, while adopting restrictive covenants at the
initial creation of a development may be an easy task undertaken
solely by the developer, retroactive adoption is much more difficult.
Therefore, although existing homeowners may desire to define the
character of their neighborhoods with restrictions and covenants, the
difficulty of retroactive adoption of private covenants has such
neighborhoods turning to public land tools to achieve similar
results. 24
Although developer-created covenants are easier to create, they are
criticized for allowing the developer to control the substance of the
covenants with little regulatory oversight and virtually no input from
the homeowners that ultimately reside in the community. 25
Homeowners have the right to amend and modify the agreement once
the units in the development are sold to private homeowners, but they
rarely exercise this right.26
This control can be especially
troublesome for homeowners who inherit the developer's covenants
because a primary objective for the developer in drafting the
covenants is to make the project appear more stable and attractive in
the eyes of potentials lenders.2 7 Thus, the interests of the developer
22. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 732.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Siegel, supra note 17, at 34.
26. Id. at 35 ("In fact, the rule regime is often remarkably resistant to change,
because, in most CICs, key elements of the rule regime may be modified only by a
supermajority vote of the residents.").
27. Siegel, supra note 17, at 36.
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at the time of the initial preparation of the covenants may differ
greatly from those of homeowners who ultimately live in the
community.

Enforceability
In addition to the general management of property and finances,
the HOA is primarily charged with enforcement of the covenants. 28
It is through this enforcement that the development's original land
use plan is preserved. 29 The HOA usually enforces the covenants by
assessing fines against homeowners in violation. 30 If the fines go
unpaid, the HOA can attach a lien to the individually-owned property
for the value of the outstanding fines, which ultimately could lead to
a forced sale.3
The HOA could traditionally use the threat of
foreclosure on the outstanding lien as leverage to force the violating
homeowner to come into compliance with the covenant and pay any

outstanding fines,32 but in today's economic climate the threat of
foreclosure does not carry the same sting.33
III. PUBLIC LAND USE ToOLS
TraditionalEuclidean Zoning
History

Zoning became a phenomenon in the United States in the early
1900s. In New York, the construction of the Equitable Building in
1915 highlighted the need for height and setback restrictions on city
buildings.34 Upon completion, the Equitable Building cast a sevenacre shadow over neighboring buildings, impacting the

28. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 713.
29. Hyatt, supra note 7, at 10.
30. Siegel, supra note 17, at 33.
31. Id. at 32. See generally Gemma Giantomasi, A Balancing Act: The
Foreclosure Power of Honeowners' Associations, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 2503

(2004).
32. Furman, supra note 20, at 756.
33. Id. at 757.
34. About

Zoning:

Background,

N.Y.C.

DEP'T

OF

CITY

PLANNING,

http://xwww.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis.shtmi (last visited May 17, 2011).
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neighborhood's access to light and air.35 In addition to the Equitable
Building, the increase of the immigrant population and
accompanying need for tenant housing caused a blurring of lines
between housing areas, upscale retail and factory uses.36 In response
to these developments, New York City enacted the Zoning
Resolution of 1916, a simple document dictating height and setback
requirements as well as appropriate uses that set the stage for more
wide-spread zoning initiatives. 7 Thereafter, in the landmark 1926
Supreme Court case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., the
Court upheld the constitutionality of municipal zoning ordinances as
a justified use of a government's police power.3 8 The Zoning
Resolution of 1916 continued as the primary source of zoning
regulation in NYC until the enactment of the 1961 Zoning
Resolution.39 The 1961 Resolution was a comprehensive plan that
addressed use regulations, parking requirements, open spaces and
incentive zoning. 40 Zoning today can take a number of different
forms which can be used in combination to create a comprehensive
plan, including incentive zoning, contextual zoning and special
purpose district techniques. 4 1 Likewise, a more flexible approach of
allowing a mixed use of development to create an inclusive
neighborhood of residential, light commercial, and services has met
35. Id.
36. Id.

Id.
38. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
39. About Zoning: Background, supra note 34.
40. Id. ("It [The 1961 Resolution] introduced incentive zoning by adding a
bonus of extra floor space to encourage developers of office buildings and
apartment towers to incorporate public plazas into their projects.").
41. About Zoning: Zoning Today, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://xwww.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zoning today.shtml (last visited Dec. 20,
2011).
Zoning Glossary, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING, See also
http://xwww.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/glossary.shtml (last visited Oct. 13, 2011)
("Incentive Zoning provides a bonus, usually in the form of additional floor area, in
exchange for the provision of a public amenity or affordable housing"; "Contextual
zoning regulates the height and bulk of new buildings, their setback from the street
line, and their width along the street frontage, to produce buildings that are
consistent with existing neighborhood character"; Special Purpose Districts are
"designed to supplement and modify the underlying zoning in order to respond to
distinctive neighborhoods with particular issues and goals.").
37.
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the need for neighborhood planning consistent with new urbanism
initiatives.
Since the advent of zoning regulations in New York City, model
acts were created to provide direction to other cities and
municipalities wanting to adopt zoning guidelines. Under the
leadership of then-Secretary of Cormnerce, Herbert Hoover, an
advisory group drafted the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
(SZEA) which was published in 1924 and revised in 1926. 42 The
Department of Commerce published a second model, the Standard
City Planning Enabling Act, in 1927 which was finalized in 1928.43
These acts formed the basic foundation for zoning enabling
regulations throughout the country. 44 Enabling legislation authorizes
local go vernments to exercise authority over its territory that would
otherwise be controlled at the state level.4 5 Despite the obvious
benefits of zoning ordinances, they were recognized as "radical
departure(s) from the traditional concepts of private property because
it was perceived as prohibiting a citizen from devoting his property to
a purpose" that was otherwise legal and harmless. 46 Because of the
restrictions it places on the rights of a private landowner, there exists
still today a belief that "any zoning is an unreasonable restriction on
the rights of private property owners." 47
Zoning falls within a state's police power and thus enabling
legislation is needed in order to give local municipalities the power to

42. Standard State Zoning Enabling Act and Standard City Planning Enabling
http://www.planning.org/growingsmart/
Ass'N,
PLANNING
AM.
Act,
enablingacts.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Stephen A. Morris, Zoning and Historic Preservation, in CULTURAL
RESOURCES PARTNERSHIP NOTES 1 (June 1998), http://",www.nps.gov/hps/pad!
partnership/Zoning699.pdf.
45. Stephen A. Morris, Zoning and Historic Preservation, in CULTURAL
RESOURCES PARTNERSHIP NOTES 1 (June 1998), http://""www.nps.gov/,"hps/pad!
partnership/Zoning699.pdf.
46. Fayette Cnty Office of Planning, Zoning and Cmty Dev. v. Joseph
Cellurale, Sr., No. 1774, 2007 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 375, at *4 (Oct. 23,
2007) (quoting EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING, 1-10, (4th ed. 2007)).
47. Id. at *6-7.
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plan and adopt zoning regulations within their boundaries. 48 The
SZEA required zoning ordinances to comply with a comprehensive
plan, 49 authorized the municipality to divide its geographic area into
districts, and recommended procedures for adopting and amending
zoning districts. The SZEA had been adopted in whole or part in 19
states by 1925.50 By 1926, more than 70 cities had adopted zoning
regulations and an additional 1,246 municipalities had adopted it by
1936.s' In 1975, the American Law Institute adopted the Model
Land Development Code and it became the newest model land use
legislation since the SZEA.52
Despite its long history, zoning can be one of the most
controversial activities falling to a local governing body and
generating emotional energy from residents, developers and
environmentalists alike.s5 Private property owners oftentimes resent
the imposition of government imposed restrictions on the otherwise
lawful and harmless use of his or her private property.5 4 On the other
hand, developers cite to the "complexity and length" of most zoning
codes that make compliance expensive and difficult. 5 Additional
complaints about traditional zoning revolve around its exclusionary
nature based on usage as opposed to a broader design tool that would
pennit multiple uses within a zone as long as the overall quality of
the development comported to established design criteria. 56 Lastly,
48. Morris, supra note 45, at 1.
49. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STANDARD
STATE ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING

REGULATIONS 6 (rev. ed. 1926); available at

http://"x xwww.planning.org/growingsmart/pdf/SZEnablingActl926.pdf.
50. Ronald H. Rosenberg, Referendum Zoning: Legal Doctrine and Practice, 53
U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 381 n.2 (1984).
51. William A. Fischel, An Economic History qf Zoning and a Cure for its
Exclusionar}y Effects, 41 URB. STU. 317, 319 (2004).
52. See EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND

PLANNING

§ 1:3 (4th ed. 2011).

53. See I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 526 S.E.2d 716, 721 (S.C. 2000).
54. See Edward H. ZIEGLER, JR. ET AL., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND

PLANNING

§ 1:2 (4th ed. 2011).

55. See Richard S. Geller, The Legality of Form-Based Zoning Codes, 26 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. LAW 35, 39, (2010).

56. See Roger K. Lewis, Traditional Zoning Can't Aeet the Challenge of
Modern Development, WASH. PoST, July 24, 2004, at F4, available at
http:/xxwww.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A9505-2004Jul23.html.
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environentalists object to traditional zoning and its resulting urban
sprawl because it increased the use of and created a dependence on
vehicular traffic. 7 Thus, there is motivation from various places to
reconsider how municipalities make and impose land use decisions
and whether traditional Euclidean zoning is the best approach.
Types
Traditional zoning ordinances are broad-based in their approach to
regulating land use. Zoning ordinances seek to control population
growth, building density, traffic, resource management, historic
areas, and public services to promote "public health, safety, morals,
convenience, order, appearance, prosperity and general welfare"58 of
existing and future communities. To achieve these goals, zoning
regulations may authorize and local municipalities may employ a
variety of zoning techniques. 59 A hallmark of standard zoning is that
the zoning ordinances will apply uniformly to all of the property
within a zoning boundary.60
Generally, zoning regulations separate different types of land uses
to ensure their compatibility within the same community. 6 1 One of
the underlying beliefs of traditional zoning is that by separating the
uses through the implementation of zoning boundaries and
ordinances, each class of land use is protected from the negative
impacts of other uses. 62 General use districts pernit a variety of uses
within their boundary; conditional use districts permit only a limited
type of use within their boundary; and overlay districts exist within a
general or conditional district, and impose additional limitations on
the use of the property. 63 Initially, zoning ordinances separated the
57. See Geller, supra note 55, at 77.
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-710 (A) (2011); POn, L.L.C., 526 S.E.2d at 720.
59. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-720 (C) (2011); see also I'On, L.L.C., 526
S.E.2d at 720.
60. Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning that is
Neither Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 386
(2004).
61. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 714.
62. Green, supra note 60, at 386-87.
63. See RALEIGH, N.C., CITY CODE § 10-2011(b) (2011), available at
http://1ibrary.municode.com/index.aspx?clientlD=10312&statelD=33&statename=
North%20Carolina.
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geographic areas into three districts: residential, commercial, and
industrial 64 but as zoning became a more prevalent practice, the
complexity of zoning regions increased.65 Today, types of zoning
districts can differ significantly, and depending on the size of the city
or town, the number of different zoning districts can be vast. 66
Zoning districts can separate land use based on the type of uses
(commercial, heavy industrial, single family, residential, multi-family
residential) and furthermore by the type of individual uses within the
district (grocery, retail, office). 67 Despite the varied use of traditional
zoning districts, they nevertheless fail to offer many options for
maintaining the community aesthetic sought by neighborhoods and
more easily protected by private covenants.68

64. David W. Owens & Andrew Stevenson, An Overview of Zoning Districts,
Design Standards, and Traditional Neighborhood Design in North Carolina Zoning
Ordinances 2 (N.C. Sch. of Gov't Special Ser. No. 23, Oct. 2007), available at
http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/pdfs/ss23.pdf.
65. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 714. The Town of Mars Hill, North
Carolina, population 1,798 as of July 2009, Mars Hill, North Carolina, CITYDATA.COM,
http://xx
www.city-data.com/city/Mars-Hill-North-Carolina.html
(last
visited Sept. 1, 2011), has 9 zoning districts that primarily address minimum lot
size, setbacks, and permitted uses, 1VL4RS HILL, NC, ZONING ORDINANCE § 301-09,
available at http:/'xwww.townofmarshill.org/Zoning%200rdinances.htm.
The
Town of Raleigh, North Carolina, population 405,791 as of July 2009, Raleigh,
North Carolina, CITY-DATA.cOM, http:xxx/www.city-data.com/city/Raleigh-NorthCarolina.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2011), has 24 zoning districts, each of which has
a corresponding conditional use district, and an additional 14 zoning overlay
districts,
RALEIGH,
N.C.,
CITY
CODE
§
10-2011
(2011),
http:./libraiy.municode.com/index.aspx?clientlD=10312&statelD=33&statename=
North%20Carolina. The City of Los Angeles, California has 35 zoning districts
including districts relating to the following uses: residential; agricultural;
commercial; manufacturing; institutional; industrial; resort and recreation;
scientific research and development; and open space, Los ANGELES, CA, COUNTY
CODE § 22.12.010 (2011), http://search.municode.com/html 16274/index.htm.
67. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 714; see SPRINGFIELD, OHIO, ZONING CODE §
1113.02 (2009), available at http://www.ci.springfield.oh.us/Gov/ord/ 1113.pdf.
68. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 731-32 ("Just as traditional zoning with its blunt
approach to rules fails to offer many options for controlling the sublocal
community aesthetic, applying covenants to old communities is not generally a
practically achievable endeavor.").
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The exact nature of zoning adoption and enforcement is a
combination of legislative and administrative actions, and the
distinction between legislative and administrative approaches can
inforn the type of enforcement opportunities available. The adoption
of the zoning districts typically occurs at the municipal level,
pursuant to enabling statutes.69 The local planning entity must hold
public hearings before enacting or amending zoning regulations.70 In
some jurisdictions, zoning may occur by initiative and referendum
subject to the applicable voter referendum rules, while other
jurisdictions have prohibited such initiatives, reserving zoning
decisions to the authority of the municipality.7 ' In cases prohibiting
zoning by referendum, the courts have held that the authority granted
by the legislature to the local governing body was not intended to
permit voters to decide complex matters such as zoning,7 2 and that
allowing voters to decide zoning regulations would "nullify zoning
and land use rules developed after extensive debate among a variety
of interested persons." 73
If proposed development complies with all of the provisions of the
zoning ordinances, no further municipality action is required.
Sometimes, a developer's plan requires further discretionary action
by the municipality in the forn of special permits or variances. 74
Requests for zoning map amendments, variances, or special use
permits are subject to a public review process.75 Amending the
zoning map is a legislative action, which is limited not to a specific

69. How to Avoid Problems with Local Government: Zoning Issues, THE
WITTERMAN LAw FIRM, P.C., http:/'xwww.witteran.com/Articles.shtmi
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2011) ("In turn, state government gives your local community
government the power to regulate how you use your property. The States usually

give this power to local communities through wNhat are known as State Enabling
Statutes.").
70. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-29-760(A) (2010); POn, L.L.C v. Town of Mt.

Pleasant, 526 S.E.2d 716, 720 (S.C. 2000).
71. I'On. L.L.C., 526 S.E.2d at 720-21. See id. n.4 for a list of cases.
72. See id. at 718.
73. Id. at 721.
74. See About Zoning: The Zoning Process, N.Y.C. DEP'T OF CITY PLANNING,
http://xwww.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/zone/zonehis3.shtml (last visited May. 17,
2011).
75. See id.
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development but to the larger geographic region to which the

amendment applies. 7 6
Enforcement
The effectiveness of zoning ordinances in controlling land use and
development is only as strong as the municipality's ability to enforce
the zoning rules. A local governing body has a number of remedies
available to it to enforce violations of a zoning ordinance, including
injunctive relief, imposition of penalties for violation of the zoning
ordinance, and amendment or forfeiture of zoning variances.77 Local
ordinances will typically dictate the nature and extent of enforcement
options, and will often vary significantly within a state, since the
locality has wide latitude under the enabling statutes to promulgate
its zoning ordinance.78 Section 8 of the SZEA provides that
violations of a zoning ordinance can be punishable by civil or
criminal penalties.79 Criminal sanctions for zoning violations are
considered misdemeanors punishable by fines and imprisonment.o
Some jurisdictions employ building inspectors or other officers or
agents tasked with enforcing the building code,8 ' while others rely on
citizen complaints for enforcement.82 Despite the presence of civil
and criminal liabilities for zoning violations, there may be little
76. See Id.
77. See Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v. Allendale, 357 A.2d 333, 337 (N.J.
Super Ct. Law Div. 1976).
78. E-mail from Kevin A. Medeiros, President, N.C. Ass'n of Zoning Officials,
to author (May 31, 2011, 5:11 PM EST) (on file with author).
79. ADVISORY COMM. ON ZONING, supra note 49, at 12.
80. CHAPEL HILL, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4.13.4 (2011) available at

http://library.municode.com/HTML/19952/level3/CO APXALAUSMA ART4PR.
html#CO APXALAUSMA ART4PR 4.13VIPE; Reporting Violations of the
Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision Ordinance, BOUNDARY COUNTY
PLANNING & ZONING, http://",www.boundarycountyid.org/planning/violations.htm

(last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
81. See Historic Building Enforcement Officer, HISTPRES: UNIQUE HISTORIC
PRESERVATION JOBS, (posted May 16, 2011), http://histpres.com/other/historicbuilding-enforcement-officer-city-of-san-antonio-tx;
Historic
Building
Enforcement
Officer,
PRESERVENET,
(posted
May
12,
2011),
http://www.preservenet.cornell.edu/employ/jobdetail.cfm?POSTID=2544.
82. See Reporting Violations of the Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision
Ordinance, supra note 80.
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motivation for the municipality to spend limited public funds to
litigate these matters.83
A private citizen may bring an action in equity to enforce a zoning
restriction if he or she is situated as an adjoining or proximate
landowner to the offending landowner. 84 In order to succeed, a
private citizen must establish that the violation of the zoning
ordinance has resulted in an injury that is unique to him and not one
that is shared by all surrounding neighbors.8 5 He must allege and
subsequently establish that the harm experienced is "special and
peculiar" to his property,8 6 and is "over and above the public
injury. ,,87 Injuries that are common to the surrounding landowners
will be insufficient to meet this burden.88 However, an "adjoining,
confronting or nearby property owner" is entitled to assert a zoning
violation because the mere proximity of the claimant to the offending
property owner is sufficient to establish that his damages are
unique. 89
The right of a private citizen to enforce a zoning violation exists
even if the municipality has also pursued the violation in a penalty
proceeding. 90
A private landowner need not request that the
83. See Richard Ducker, Civil Penalties and Zoning: Why Fight 'Em, Just Cite
'Em, COATES' CANONS: NC LOCAL Gov'T L. BLOG (Mar. 10, 2010, 5:13 PM),
http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/blogs/localgovt/?p=2008.
This is especially true in
places like North Carolina where the state constitution provides that "all fines
collected in the several counties for any breach of the penal laws of the State,
shall . . . [be] used exclusively for maintaining free public schools." N.C. CONsT.

art. IX, § 7. Thus, the local municipality cannot offset the cost of enforcement with
the fines collected from the zoning violation.
84. See Fox v. Township of Williams, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 266, 267 (1974).
85. See Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 94 A.2d 332, 335 (N.J. 1953) (finding
plaintiff has standing to obtain equitable injunction where his interest is distinct
from and greater than community as a whole); Allendale Nursing Home, Inc. v.
Allendale, 357 A.2d 333, 337 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1976); Fox, 67 Pa. D. &
C.2d at 267-68.
86. See Burne v. Kearney, 225 A.2d 892, 894 (Pa. 1967); Fox, 67 Pa. D. &
C.2d at 267-68.
87. Cahill v. Heckel, 208 A.2d 651, 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1965)
(quoting Sautto v. Edenboro Apartments, Inc., 202 A.2d 466, 473 (1964)).
88. See Fox, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d at 268.
89. Lee v. Osage Ridge Winery, 727 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); see
Cahill, 208 A.2d at 653 (quoting Sautto, 202 A.2d. at 474).
90. See Allendale, 357 A.2d at 337 (citing Cahill, 208 A.2d at 653).
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municipality enforce the ordinance prior to bringing a private action
to do so. 9 1 Despite the burden imposed upon an offending landowner
forced to defend himself simultaneously against the municipality and
his neighbor (with the accompanying possibility of inconsistent
decisions), the neighbor has a cause of action independent of the
municipality's.92 There are cases holding that if an adequate
statutory remedy exists, it must be exhausted before a court may
impose injunctive or declaratory relief from a provision of a zoning
ordinance.93 In those cases, failure to exhaust the statutory remedy
prohibits the court from granting injunctive or declaratory relief.94 In
Westside, however, the issue did not involve a mere challenge to the
validity of an ordinance (for which no exhaustion of remedies is
generally required) 95 but rather an attempt to change the applicable
zoning.
Contrary cases, however, have held that a private
individual does not have standing to initiate criminal proceedings
against his neighbor for violation of zoning ordinances in the
presence of a statute that neither expressly grants nor denies the right
of a private citizen to bring such an action.9 7
A wvrit of mandamus is also available for the enforcement of a
zoning action, but is only available in the absence of another
appropriate remedy.98 Mandamus exists as a remedy to force the
public official or governing body to perform a public duty they are
required to perform. In Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., the court
addressed the issue of whether mandamus is a proper means of
compelling municipal officials to enforce the terms of zoning

91. See Evans v. Roth, 201 S.W.2d 357, 361 (Mo. 1947) (quoting 10
§ 5632 (Per. Ed. 1939)); Lee, 727 S.W.2d at 222.
92. See Cahill, 208 A.2d at 653.
93. See Lee, 727 S.W.2d at 222; Westside Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Dexter,
559 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
94. See Lee, 727 S.W.2d at 223; Westside Enterprises Inc., 559 S.W.2d at 640.
95. See Westside Enterprises Inc., 559 S.W.2d at 640.
96. Id. at 641.
97. See City of Houston Houston v. Tri-Lakes Ltd., 681 So.2d 104, 105 (Miss.
1996).
98. See Unger v. Township of Hampton, 263 A.2d 385, 387 (Pa. 1970); Fox v.
Township of Williams, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 266, 267 (1974).
98. See Unger v. Township of Hampton, 263 A.2d 385, 387 (Pa. 1970); Fox v.
Township of Williams, 67 Pa. D. & C.2d 266, 267 (1974).
THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY
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ordinances.99 While the courts have found that a writ of mandamus
is sometimes an available remedy, it should only be available when
there is no other adequate relief available.100 Such other relief must
"realistically be adequate." 01

Benefits and Burdens of Traditional Zoning
Traditional zoning is generally insufficient to meet the goals of
mixed use developments because the mixed use concept is contrary
to the firn boundaries of traditional zoning. 102 Seeking variances or
other special use zoning to create a mixed use development within a
traditional zoning model would create a patchwork of ad hoc uses
that would likely fail to preserve the unique character of an existing
neighborhood community.
Overlay Districts
Neighborhood Conservation Districts
In response to the inability of traditional zoning to effectively
preserve the identity of existing neighborhoods, communities sought
additional zoning tools to regulate redevelopment.'0 3 Zoning
overlays supplement traditional zoning, and are intended to address
specific benefits or burdens in a particular geographic area by
applying supplemental rules.'04 In an overlay district, the issues of
enforcement, benefit, and burden look similar to traditional zoning
issues. Historic districts (HDs) are an instructive early example of an
overlay district. The first recorded HD was South Carolina's Old and
Historic Charleston District, recognized in 1 9 3 1.105 Since that time,
more than 13,590 historic districts have been registered with the

99. Garrou v. Teaneck Tryon Co., 94 A.2d 332, 336-37 (N.J. 1953).
100. See id. at 302.
101. See id. at 303.
102. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 731.
103. See id. at 717-18.
104. See id.
105. Preservation Advocacy, PRESERVATION SOCIETY OF CHARLESTON,
http://"www.preservationsociety. org/program advocay.asp (last visited Aug. 25,
2011).
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National Registry of Historic Places.106 The goal of historic
preservation is to protect our nation's "cultural and architectural"
heritage.107 This is achieved by municipalities providing regulations
for the construction, renovation, restoration, and demolition of
original buildings located within the designated area. 08 By imposing
the regulations through a zoning overlay, the approval of alterations
within the historic district falls to the municipality's historic district
commission or other municipality staff to review and enforce the
design rules.109
Since the advent of the historic district, there has been an increase
in the number and diversity of overlay districts. 0 Today, common
overlay districts include flood hazard, water supply, historic, corridor
protection, central business, manufactured housing, airport, and
neighborhood conservation districts.'" This increase evidences the
growing desire among property owners to preserve aesthetic qualities
of a geographic area even where the community cannot reach the
standards of a historic district.' 12
A neighborhood conservation district (NCD) is a zoning overlay
district that allows existing neighborhoods to preserve physical
amenities, affordability, and landscape features that impact the
experience of the neighbors as a community.11 3 NCDs offer some of
the protections that are traditionally found in an HD zoning overlay,
but typically the NCD's application and recognition process is not as
stringent and its protections are more flexible and customdesigned." 4 An NCD's restrictions range from the type or size of
106. See
NATIONAL
REGISTER
OF
HISTORIC
PLACES,
http://www.nationalregisterofhistoricplaces.com (last visited Aug. 25, 2011).
107. Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of Our Aspirations: Protecting
Modern and Post-Modern Architecture, 15 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 101-02
(1997).
108. See CHAPEL HILL, N.C., LAND USE MANAGEMENT ORDINANCE § 3.6.2
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ci.chapel-hill.nc.us/Modules!
ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2401
109. See id.
110. Wiseman, supra note 14, at 716.
111. See Owens & Stevenson, supra note 64, at 3-4.
112. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 716-17.
113. Id. at 717.
114. Adam Lovelady, Broadened Notions of Historic Preservation and the Role
ofNeighborhood Conservation Districts, 40 URB. LAw. 147, 148 (2008).
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outbuildings11 5 to a requirement that trashcans and dumpsters be
screened from view.'6 Guidelines in an NCD might also address
size and design specifications for homes and businesses, including a

minimum number of windows per wall, driveway composition, and
restrictions on the demolition of certain existing buildings. "1 While
private covenants have gone so far as to restrict actual uses in tenns
of number and types of pets and noise limitations, overlay districts
have not sought that degree of regulation." 8
Conservation districts date back to the mid-1970si 9 but have
increasingly become a preferred method for neighborhood-level
planning. 12 NCDs can be an attractive option for neighborhoods that
lack landowner support for a full HD designation, do not possess the
requisite historic significance for an HD designation, or do not desire
the excessive building and use limitations associated with an HD
designation. 121 NCDs may be used to prevent teardowns or to serve
as a planning tool for evolving neighborhoods wishing to adequately
address transportation, public safety and public services.1 22 Despite
their differences, historic and conservation districts can often be seen
115. See Wiseman, supra note 14, at 709.
116. See id.

117. See id
118. See id.
119. LORI SALGANICOFF, PRESERVATION ALLIANCE OF GREATER PHILADELPHIA,

NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS SURVEY

5,

8,

11

(Aug. 2003),

http:// xxwww.preservationalliance.com/publications/Conservation%/o20District%2ODe
scription.pdf) (Phoenix, AZ, "Special Conservation Districts" enacted in 1978;
Boston, IA, "Architectural Conservation Districts" enacted in 1975; Portland, OR,
"Plan Districts" enacted in 1978).
120. See Lovelady, supra note 114, at 154.
121. See id. The historic district design guidelines adopted in the Town of
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, consists of a seventy-six page document addressing
everything from appropriate exterior building materials, porches and balconies,
walkways and driveways, allowable exterior lighting, and other site features and
permitted plantings, to name a few and these design guidelines were tailored after
those of the United States Department of Interior, developed by the Department in
1976.

See CHAPEL HILL HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION, DESIGN GUIDELINES

CHAPEL HILL HISTORIC DISTRICT 5 (2001), available at http://www.ci.chapel-

hill.nc.us/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=2405.
122. See Lovelady, supra note 114, at 155; see also CITY OF SAN ANTONIO
PLANNING

DEPT,

APPENDIX

1:

CONSERVATION

DISTRICTS,

available

at

http://"x xwww.sanantonio.gov planning/neighborhoods/mahncke/Appendix%/o201.PDF.
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as interchangeable when their distinctions are subtle.123 NCDs
provide an alternative for neighborhoods worthy of preservation and
protection but that may lack the historical, architectural or cultural
importance typically the subject of an HD designation.124
In other NCDs, the focus is less on neighborhood preservation as
on planning, primarily in response to new development.125 In these
models, overlay requirements attempt to limit and control future
development by imposing restrictions on lot size, building height,
and setbacks, but might not require certain architectural or aesthetic
styles subject to the review of a design committee.126
Process
Like other zoning regulations, the local municipality must have the
authority to adopt overlays. This authority is derived from a state's
enabling power; this may be an express delegation or broad zoning
authority granted to the locality.127 The formation of an NCD is
different from private covenants because it is a public zoning
overlay, which in most instances requires public notice and input.
Community members are often invited to open discussions around
issues of future growth, degradation of the community, impact on
future development, and community aesthetics.128 The ensuing rules
can be quite detailed, contrary to traditional zoning districts and
restrictions. These zoning overlay restrictions can be as detailed as
the regulations found in private covenants.129 Since the adoption of
an overlay district requires the action of the municipality's public

123. See id. at 158 (observing that Nashville, TN's full HP District controls the
construction, alteration, repair, relocation or demolition of a structure within its
boundaries while the NCD controls the construction, alteration, repair, relocation or
demolition of a structure within its boundaries while the NCD controls the
construction, relocation, demolition of structures only). Lovelady refers to NCDs
as "Preservation-Lite or Regulation-Lite." Id. at 157.
124. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE §35-335 (a)(1)
(2004), available at http://''www.sanantonio.gov'planning/pdf!Neighborhoods!
NCDs/NCD EnablingOrdinance_-_UDCSection_35-335.pdf.
125. See Lovelady, supra note 114, at 162.
126. See id
127. See id at 155.
128. See Wiseman, supra note 14, 717.

129. See id at 719.
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body, the jurisdiction's open meeting laws are implicated.,s 0
Pursuant to open meeting laws, legislatively mandated in most
jurisdictions, any meeting of a government body must be open to the
public if the government body will take action that must be recorded
in the minutes.'
The requirement that the meetings be open to the
public pursuant to the open meeting laws is mandate and not merely
discretionary.132 Open meeting laws are designed to ensure that "the
formation of public policy and decisions is public business and shall
not be conducted in secret."13 3 The open meeting law requirement
serves to benefit the public's access to information about proposed
overlay adoptions, and together with public notice requirements,
provide a significant opportunity for community input into the
proposed changes to their neighborhoods.
The process for creating a neighborhood conservation district
varies by jurisdiction. In San Antonio, TX, an application for
designation as an NCD may be initiated by owners representing 51%
of the land area within the proposed district or 51% of property
owners within the proposed district.13 4 Once the boundaries of the
district have been identified, the San Antonio ordinance permits all
property owners within the proposed district to participate in drafting
the specifics of the NCD,13 which the City Council ultimately
approves as part of the zoning ordinance.' 36 In Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, the Land Use Management Ordinance (LUMO) adopts a
two-phase approach for NCD designation. The initial petition may
be initiated by 510%of land owners in the proposed district or owners
130. See 4 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUN. CORPS. §13:10 (3rd ed. 2011).

131. See id.
132. See id.
133. TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-44-101(a)(2011); Johnston v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville & Davidson County, 320 S.W.3d 299, 309 (2009).
134. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE

§ 35-335(d)(1)(A)-

(B)
(2004),
available
at
http://",www.sanantonio.gov planning/pdf/
Neighborhoods/NCDs/NCD Enabling Ordinance - UDC Section 35-335.pdf.
Similarly, in Chapel Hill, NC, see CHAPEL HILL HISTORIC DISTRICT COMMISSION,

supra note 121.
135. See id. § 35-335(d)(3).
136. See News Release, City of San Antonio, Public meeting set for the proposed
Woodlawn Lake Neighborhood Conservation District (Aug. 16, 2010), available at
http:// www.sanantonio.govinews/NewsReleases/nr2010woodlawNnpublicmeeting.as
p?res= 1280&ver--true.

2011]

21XED-USE DEVELOPMWENT NEXT DOOR

75

owning 51% of the land area in the proposed district.' 7 The Chapel
Hill Planning Department makes a recommendation to the
municipality whether to adopt a plenary or committee structure for
the creation of the NCD design guidelines. 138 In plenary design
approach, the municipality's planning department facilitates a
dialogue to open the process to the entire neighborhood.1 9
The San Antonio code requires that the NCD include Design
Standards that minimally address building height, building size,
principal elevation features, lot size, setbacks, off-street parking
requirements, roof line and pitch, and paving and hardscape
covering.140 Similarly, the Chapel Hill LUMO requires that the
design standards of the NCD minimally include building size and
height, lot size, setbacks, off-street parking, roof line and pitch, and
hardscape coverings.141
Enforcement
Since NCDs are zoning overlays, the process for enforcing the
design requirements within an NCD will typically fall to the same
process for general zoning violations. If the violation occurs during
the design phase of a building permit request, the permit will be
denied pending compliance with the NCD standard.142 If the
violation occurs outside of the permit process, the municipality has
the authority to impose civil penalties.143 In those jurisdictions that
designate an individual or commission to enforce historic district
designations, the role of enforcing NCD requirements will likely fall

137. See Town of Chapel Hill Planning Dep't, Land Use Management Ordinance
§ 3.6.5(c)(1)(A)
(2003),
available at http:/
xwww.townofchapelhill.org/
modules/ShowDocument.aspxdocumentid=8733.
138. See id. § 3.6.5(c)(2)(G).
139. See id. §§ 3.6.5(c)(2)(F), 3.6.5(c)(2)(J).
140. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE § 35-335(e)(3)(A)(H) (2004).
141. See Town of Chapel Hill Planning Dep't, Land Use Management
Ordinance, § 3.6.5(e)(3) (2003).
142. See E-mail from Gary Edenburn, Deputy Project Manager, City of San
Antonio, to author (May 31, 2011, 8:46 AM EST) (on file with author).
143. See CHARLOTTESVILLE, VA.., CODE § 34-340 (f), available at
http://library.municode.com/index.aspx?clientlD=12078&statelD=46&statenaie=
Virginia.
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to the same individual or group.14 4 Individual complaints can be a
frequent source of reporting violations.14 5 Even if the municipality
receives reports of violations, verifying the presence of the violation
can require a "lengthy and invasive" investigation, which local
governments often lack the resources to conduct.14 6 The lack of an
effective enforcement mechanism is the Achilles' heel of NCDs.147
With the increased use of NCDs, the ability to enforce them must be
addressed. Because the land use restrictions in an NCD are less
stringent and detailed than those in a historic district, they are easier
and more efficient to police, but still require personnel and municipal
resources. 4 8 Thus, "any gain in efficiency is lost to increased
volume."1 49
Benefits and Burdens of NCDs
The benefits of a NCD include its ability to be custom-tailored to
the needs of the specific neighborhood, and to avoid the stringent
requirements of a historic district. 5 0 NCDs offer a compromise
between neighbors desiring a level of preservation and protection and
those that fear the classification will lead to increased housing
costs.' 5 ' Likewise, NCDs reach a broader set of neighborhoods' 52
and offer an alternative to those neighborhoods that primarily seek to
prevent teardowns and inform (but not prevent) new development

144. See Historic Building Enforcement Officer, supra note 8 1.
145. See Reporting V7iolations of the Boundary County Zoning and Subdivision
Ordinance, supra note 80.
146. See Katelyn Ferral, Northside rules not working: Town to review
conservation district Mlonday, THE CHAPEL

http://x

HILL NEWS

(May 22, 2011),

xwww.chapelhillnews.com/2011 05/22/v-print/64543/northside-rules-not-

working.htm1.

147. See Lovelady, supra note 114, at 156.
148. Id. at 177 (citing Telephone Interview with Ann Roberts, Executive
Director, Nashville-Davidson County Metropolitan Historical Commission"
Metropolitan Historic Zoning Commission in Nashville, Tenn. (May 4, 2007)).
149. Id. at 177 (citing E-mail from Tracey Cox, Planner, City of Dallas, to
Lovelady (May 8, 2007, 16:17 EST) (on file with Lovelady)).
150. See id at 175.
151. See id
152. See id at 176.
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and growth. 5 3 When new development is proposed for an area
subject to an NCD, the developer will work with the municipality to
ensure the project is in compliance with the NCD requirements.
Developers may appreciate a set of design standards that inform their
plans from the outset.'5 4
Like any land use ordinance, the primary objection to NCDs is the
imposition of land use restrictions on privately held property.' 5
Opponents also worry that too much preservation results in stagnant
neighborhoods that fail to encourage the influx of energy that new
development can bring to a community.' 5 6 Individual homeowners
that seek the protection of NCDs to prevent tear dowvns or high
density are often unprepared for the impact the NCD requirements
will have on their abilities to renovate or upgrade their own homes.'5 7
Although the overlays may encourage conversations between
developers and landowners about the details of the NCD
requirements, accusations can emerge that developers participated in
the conversation to have a "voice in the process" while continuing to
create developments plans that "technically meet the regulations but
still allow the properties to function" in an unapproved use.' 5 8
Another challenge associated with overlay districts is the degree to
which one can "opt out" of the overlay. If there are significant
numbers of homeowners that object to the adoption of an overlay
district, the municipality may be reticent about adopting the overlay
for fear of reprisals at the polls.1 9 To encourage the adoption of the
overlay, proponents may provide an "opt out" provision to satisfy
more constituents in the voting pool and reduce the municipality's
exposure to disgruntled voters.160 Opt out provisions, however,
jeopardize the underlying value of the overlay. If a fundamental
purpose of an overlay is to create design rules to preserve the historic
153. See id. at 177 (citing Telephone Interview with Ann Roberts, supra note
148).
154. See E-Mail from Gary Edenburn, supra note 142.
155. See Lovelady, supra note 114, at 175.
156. See id. ("[S]tifling important redevelopment.").
157. See Ferral, supra note 146.
158. See id.
159. See Johnston v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty, 320 S.W.3d
299 at 303, 309 (2009).
160. See id. at 305.
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and aesthetic character of a neighborhood, the presence of excluded
lots defeats this purpose.'61
Finally, there can be a significant time lapse between the initiation
of an NCD designation and the final government approval of the
NCD's guidelines.' 62 If one of the purposes of an NCD is to have
input in the redevelopment of adjacent property, and a developer is
involved in the negotiations of the NCD guidelines, this elapsed time
can have an impact on the developer's building and financing
options. The amount of time required from initiation to approval
varies depending on the model for NCD creation adopted by the
municipality. 163
NCDs offer significant opportunity for public dialogue that can
impact the municipality's ultimate design guidelines. The degree of
public input varies depending on the model of NCD creation adopted.
The NCD process can bring a developer and adjacent homeowners to
the same table to exchange ideas and concerns, thus decreasing the
likelihood of strong public opposition to the development at the time
of approval. In an instance where the NCD boundary includes both
existing neighborhoods and new, mixed use development, the NCD
must seek to address the myriad of needs and land uses associated
with these different uses. This challenge will often require different
design guidelines for different portions of the NCD. This patchwork
result, combined with the challenges associated with enforcement,

161. See id. at 303.
162. See PLANNING DEP'T, TOWN OF CHAPEL HILL, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ABOUT NEIGHBORHOOD CONSERVATION DISTRICTS 7, 11 (2009) (indicating time
periods from 10 months to 2 years for final approval of the NCD guidelines for
NCDs in the Town of Chapel Hill, North Carolina) available at
http:// www.townofchapelhill.org/modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=726.
x
163. See id. at 5-6,11; but compare to Conditional Use Rezoning, City of

Raeligh,
January
11,
2012,
http:/'xxwww.raleighnc.govienvironment/
content/CityMgrDevServices/Articles/RezoningConditionalUse.html (recognizing
that Chapel Hill, North Carolina's NCD process has two steps, and the process
permits a committee of citizens to make recommendations to the Planning Board
about the contents of the NCD and the decision-making mechanism by the
committee is generally consensus-based. Thus, the Chapel Hill process has the
potential to be significantly longer than the process in Raleigh, North Carolina
where the petitions are reviewed by the staff and recommended for approval
directly to the City Council).
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serve as a disincentive for community members and developers alike
to embark on the lengthy NCD process.
Development Agreements

Introduction
Development agreements grew out of the increase in large,
complex projects implemented over time by developers who sought
some assurance that the local development regulations would not
substantially change over their projects' durations.1 64 Much of the
early design and development phase associated with a new
development occurs prior to the developer receiving the
municipality's approval to proceed with the project. 165 The
uncertainty associated with the building approval process, especially
long-term projects, discouraged investment in and commitment to
comprehensive planning between the developer and the
municipality. 166 The primary advantage sought by developers in
these agreements is the promise that zoning ordinances will remain
constant for the life of the agreement.167 In effect, a development
agreement freezes the municipality's rules, regulations, and policies
for the life of the development agreement with respect to a specific
project.168 Local governrnent agencies might use the development
agreement to seek funding, land, and other support for schools, parks,
community facilities, or affordable housing projects.169 This should
be distinguished from the zoning variance offered to a developer in
164. See David Owens, Development Agreements, County Attorneys' Winter
Conference,
1 (Feb.
14,
2009),
http://'"www.sog.unc.edu/programs/
attorneyconferences/conferences.php (use the Development Agreements hyperlink,
under the 2009 County Attorneys Winter Conference heading, to download a copy
of the paper).
165. See Brad K. Schwartz, Development Agreements: Contracting for Vested

Rights, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 719, 719 (2001).
166. See Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, LLC. v. Town of Mammoth Lakes,
191 Cal. App. 4th 435, 443 (2010).
167. See Queen Anne's Conservation, Inc. v. County Comm'rs, 382 Md. 306,
308-09 (2004); see Owens, supra note 164, at 2; see also Schwartz, supra note 165,
at 721.
168. See Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 442.
169. See INSTITUTE FOR LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
MANUAL: COLLABORATION IN PURSUIT OF COMMUNITY INTERESTS 28 (2002).
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exchange for the developer's promise to provide services or
infrastructures that benefit the larger community.' 70 Development
agreements based on a bargaining model, which place emphasis on
flexible plaming and mutually agreeable land use solutions,
represent an increasingly popular approach to land use decisionmaking. 7 1 Development agreements are negotiated agreements
between the municipality and the developer wherein the municipality
agrees to freeze the zoning regulations that will apply to the project
in exchange for a voice in the development's design, the creation of
certain social initiatives, or both.172
Development agreements can be as comprehensive or as narrowly
tailored as the parties may desire,173 which requires them to think
critically about the agreement's goals. The scope of issues that the
development agreement might address may include the types of uses
on the property, the density of the development, maximum building
height and size, public use projects and reservation of property for
public use, financing for the public projects, and timelines for
projected completion and duration of the agreement.174 The
development agreement might also address whether the project will
comply with mass transit opportunities, thus placing density
requirements on the development necessary to ensure public
financing for and access to mass transit stations.' 7 5
Process
Development agreements are contracts entered into by the
municipality and the developer 76 as the parties with the "legal or

170. See Owens, supra note 164, at 2.
171. See Green supra note 60, at 392; see also Erin Ryan, Zoning, Taking, and
Dealing: The Problems and Promise of Bargaining in Land Use Planning
Conflicts, 7 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 337, 343-48 (2002).
172. See Green, supra note 60, at 393.
173. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 25.

174. See id. at 26 (text box figure on the left margin).
175. See id. at 28.
176. See Queen Anne's Conservation, Inc. v. County Comm'rs, 382 Md. 306 at
309 (citing the amicus brief that the National Association of Home Builders filed in
the case).
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equitable interest" in the real property subject to the agreement.' 7 7 In
addition, the agreement should join any other parties without whom
the municipality would not receive the "benefit of its bargain" and
whom would not otherwise be bound by the agreement.
In addition to identifying the necessary parties to the agreement,
the development agreement must also contain a tern of duration.179
Unlike an NCD overlay, which does not have an expiration date, the
development agreement will only last as long as its term, prior
tenination by the parties or in the event of a breach.i80
In 1979, California was the first state to statutorily grant authority
to cities and counties to enter into agreements with landowners
regarding property development.i8 1
Several states have since
followed suit.182 In several statutes, the use of the development
agreement is optional and it is within the discretion of the county,
city or local governing board to adopt this particular tool.11 Some
177. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65865(a) (2011); see also INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL
SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 50; see generally National Parks &
Conservation Assn. v. County of Riverside, 42 Cal. App. 4th 1505 (1996).
178. See CAL. GOv'T CODE § 65868.5 (2011); see also INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL
SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 50.
179. N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
§
153A-349.6
(2011),
available at
http://xx'www.ncga.state.nc.us/
EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML 3/BySection/Chapter 153A/GS_153A349.6.html; INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supranote 169, at 51.
180. INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supranote 169, at 52.
181. Owens, supra note 164, at 1.
182. Id. (These states include, Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maryland, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, South Carolina,
Virginia, and Washington).
183. N.C. Gen. Stat.
160A-400.22 ("A local government may establish
procedures and requirements, as provided in this Part, to consider and enter into

develkpm ent agreements with developcrs"); Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Alm. $382.102
("A County may enter into a devekpmnc t agrem nt with an owner of land"): S.C
Code Ami. § 6-1-1050 "(A fee payor and deelopcr may enter into an g r eme nt
with a governmenta entity, icluding an agreement entered into pursuant to the

South Carolina Local Government Development Agreement Act"); N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. § 48-02.1-03 ("A public authority may negotiate and enter into a
development agreement with any private operator."); Alaska Stat. Ann. §
38.05.027(a) ("the commissioner, ... may enter into cooperative resource
management or development agreements with the federal government, a state

agency, a village or municipality, or a person."); Utah Code Ann. § 17-2 7 a-102(b)
("counties may enact all ordinances, resolutions, and rules and may enter into other
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common areas of statutory regulation in development agreements are
the minimum land area that can be subject to the development
agreement, the maximum duration of the agreement, and the degree,
if any, to which changes in local zoning laws will impact the
development.184 In addition to these basic design concepts, the
development agreement might also include regulatory issues - traffic,
utilities, environental impacts - and less-tangible benefits for the
local government (e.g., affordable housing, school construction, and
similar improvements).1
Even in those jurisdictions that have no
statutory enabling law permitting the development agreements, they
have been nonetheless sanctioned in light of their effective means of
allowing municipalities to more effectively control land use.186
Proceeding with a development agreement outside the presence of an
enabling statute, however, should not be undertaken lightly. 8 7
The consideration developers offer in exchange for the zoning
concessions includes public facilities that serve the development and
surrounding community. 88 Although, in states like North Carolina.
development agreements cannot impose any tax or fee in exchange
forms of land use controls and development agreements"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 36.70B.170(1) ("A local government may enter into a development agreement
with a person having ownership or control of real property within its jurisdiction.");
Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 94.504(1) ("A city or county may enter into a development
agreement..."); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 473.756 (12) ("The authority may enter into a
development agreement with the team, the county, or any other entity...") Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9-500.05(A) ("A municipality, by resolution or ordinance, may
enter into development agreements relating to property"); Fla. Stat. Ann. §
163.3245(8) ("A developer... may enter into a development agreement with a local
government...")
184. See id. at 3 (discussing N.C.G.S. §§ 153A-379A-379.6; 160A-400.25,
which state that the agreement must include a clear identification of the exact land
involved, the duration of the agreement, a description of the uses of the property,
the population density of the development, and building types, intensities,
placement, and design).
185. Owens, supra note 164, at 3.
186. Green, supra note 60, at 395-96; Bollech v. Charles Cnty., 166 F. Supp. 2d
443, 454 (2001).
187. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET. AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC

FACILITIES 101 (2003).

188. See Owens, supra note 164, at 3.
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for promises contained therein, some local governments have found
adequate authority, in the absence of the statutes to the contrary, to
negotiate cost-sharing and financial matters beyond tax or fee based
mechanisms. 1
Whether the execution of a development agreement is a legislative
act or an administrative act has implications for its adoption and its
enforcement.190 A legislative decision is based in public policy that
considers the population as a whole, as opposed to an administrative
act, which applies general rules to a particular set of facts.19' In the
case of the North Carolina statute authorizing development
agreements, the use of the development agreement is optional' 92 but
the local governing board must adopt each development agreement as
an ordinance.19 3 The ordinance approval process makes the
development agreement process a "legislative act."194
In several states, the public's input into the development agreement
must be sought prior to its approval.195 Including stakeholders in the
conversation about the development agreement and its tenns early in
189. See id.
190. Schwartz, supra note

165,

at 743

(citing Robert M. Kessler, The

Development Agreement and Its Use in Resolving Large Scale, Multi-Party
Development Problems: A Look at the Tool and Suggestions for its Application, 1
J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 470-71 (1985).

191. Schwartz, supra note 165, at 743; Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward
The Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the
Theoretical Foundations qf Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957,
1012, (1987). For a comparison between CAL Gov CODE § 65867.5(a) (2011) and
HAW. REv. STAT. §§46-131 (2011), see infra note 203.
192. N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
§
153A-349.3
(2011),
available
at
http://",,'www.ncga.state.nc.us/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/byarticle/chapter 153a

/article 18.htnl; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-400.22 (2011), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us./EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML /BySection/Chapter
160A/G S 160A-400.24.html.
193. Owens, supra note 164, at 2.
194. See Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Town of Mammoth

Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th 435, 442 (2010).
195. Green, supra note 60, at 399; see CAL Gov CODE § 65867 (Deering 2011);
FLA. STAT. § 163.3225(1) (2011) (requiring at least two public hearings); HAW.
REV. STAT.

§ 46-128 (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 33:4780.28 (2011); MD. CODE

ANN. art. 66B, § 13.01(d)(2) (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A-323(a) (2011); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-31-50 (a) (2010) (requiring at least two public hearings); WASH.
REV. CODE

§ 36.70B.200 (2011); INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra

note 169, at 32.
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the process will decrease the likelihood of conrnunity backlash when
the terms of the development agreement are made more widely
known.196 The North Carolina statutes provide that the terms of the
development must be subjected to a public hearing prior to its
adoption by the governing board.197 Public notice requirements are
the same for development agreements as more routine zoning
ordinance amendments.1 98
Jurisdictions also differ with respect to whether the approval of the
development agreement is subject to voter referendum. Because the
development agreement is approved by ordinance, it may be subject
to referendum, which would allow the public to overturn approval of
the agreement.199 This can be true because the adoption of the
development is deemed a legislative act 2 00 administrative decisions
are not subject to voter referenda. 20 1 In those jurisdictions where
entry into development agreements is subject to voter repeal through
the referendum process, the effective date of the development
agreement must be postponed until the expiration of the referendum
period.202 Contrarily, if the entry of a development agreement is
merely an administrative act, it may not be repealed by
referendum.

203

Just as the negotiation and adoption of an overlay

196. INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 33.

197. N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
§
153A-323(a) (2011),
available
at
http://"'www.ncga.state.nc.us/enactedlegislation/statutes/html/byarticle/chapter 153a
/article 18.html.
198. See id. §§ 153A-379.5, 160A-400.24 (2011); Owens, supra note 164, at 2.
199. See Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 442.
200. Green, supra note 60, at 399; see COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. 24-68-104(2)
(West 2010).
201. Schwartz, supra note 165, at 743 (citing David A. Callies, Development
Agreements, in ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS ch. 9A, at 22 (2000)).
202. See Midway Orchards v. County of Butte, 220 Cal. App. 3d 765, 781
(1990); INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 32; Green,
supra note 60, at 399.
203. See I'On, L.L.C v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 526 S.E.2d 716, 721 (S.C. 2000);
Green, supra note 60, at 399; Chris Grygiel, City attorney: Tunnel agreement not
subject to public vote, SEATTLEPI (March 29, 2011 at 12:44 PM),
http://blog.seattlepi.com/seattlepolitics/2011 03/29/city-attorney-tunnel-agreementnot-subject-to-public-vote/. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65867.5(a) (Deering
2011) ("A development agreement is a legislative act that shall be approved by
ordinance and is subject to referendum"). But see, HAW REv. STAT. § 46-
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district is subject to open meeting laws, so is the discussion and
debate surrounding entering into a development agreement. 20 4 The
notice requirements for public hearings on the development
agreement are typically the same as those for other zoning
* 205
decisions.
Once the agreement is adopted by the local governing board, it
must be recorded with the register of deeds in the county where the
property is located, and it becomes binding on subsequent purchasers
for value.206 Periodic review may be required by the statute as well as
opportunities to amend, extend, or cancel the agreement. 207 Like
other contracts, amending its terms requires the mutual agreement of
the parties, 208 and is likely subject to the same review and approval
procedure as the original development agreement29
If the approval of a development agreement is a legislative act, the
standard of review for the adoption of a development agreement
occurs under traditional mandamus procedures. 2 10 Mandamus is a
writ issued by a court to compel performance of a particular act by a
131 (2011) ("Each development agreement shall be deemed an administrative act
of the governing body").
204. INSTITUTE FOR LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 34.
205. See id. at 35 (Showing a comparison of California's zoning and
development agreement notice requirements).
206. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868.5 (Deering 2011) (10 days to record); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 153A-349.11 (2011) (Must be recorded within 14 days); INSTITUTE
FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 39.
207. See N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
§ 153A-349.8 (2011)
available
at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us./EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML /BySection/Chapter
153A/GS 153A-349.8.html.
208. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65868 (Deering 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 153A349.9 (2011); INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 40.
209. See CAL. GOVT CODE § 65868 (Deering 2011) (providing that the
development agreement can be amended by the mutual consent of the parties,
pursuant to § 65867, and cancellation of the development agreement requires the
mutual consent of the parties and is subject to the notice and referendum
requirements of § 65867.5); HAw. REv. STAT. § 46-130 (2011) (providing
amendment occurs by mutual consent of parties, but if amendment would
substantially alter original development agreement, amendment must be subject to
public hearing); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-651 1A (2011) (allowing for modification
of development agreement after public hearing): INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF
GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 40.
210. See Neighbors in Support of Appropriate Land Use v. County of Tuolumne,
157 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1004 (2007).
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lower court or a governmental officer or body, usually to correct a
prior action or failure to act.2 1 In a traditional mandamus action, the
only question for review by the trial court is whether or not the
municipality's actions were "arbitrary, capricious, or entirely without
evidentiary support, and whether it failed to conform to procedures
required by law." 212 The trial court may not substitute its judgment
for the judgment of the public body but may exercise its
"independent judgment" in determining whether the agency's action
was "consistent with applicable law." 213
Enforcement
The power to enforce these agreements lies with the governing
agency that was a party to the agreement.2 4 Although the statutes
might articulate how notices of breach must occur and the degree to
which opportunities for cures must be afforded,2 1 5 they may be silent
on the specific mechanisms for enforcement and remedies. 216 Most
agreements provide for specific performance of the agreement.2 17
Because the development agreement is a contract, the breach may
also be subject to monetary and liquidated damages as well as
specific performance. 2 18
The process for enforcing a development agreement is grounded in
contract law, but similar to zoning violations, the route to
211. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).

212. See Neighbors in Support, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 1004 (citing Pitts v. Perluss,
58 Cal.2d 824, 833 (1962)).
213. Id. (citing Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. San Francisco
Airports Com., 21 Cal. 4th 352, 361 (1999)).
214. N.C.
Gen.
Stat.
§ 153A-349.8(b)
(2011)
available
at
http:.//,'www.ncga.state.nc.us/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter
153A/GS 153A-349.8.html.
215. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 153A-349.8, 160A-400.27 (2011); INSTITUTE FOR
LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 40.

216. See Owens, supra note 164, at 4, 24 ("In addition to any other rights or
remedies, any Party may institute legal action against a defaulting Party to cure,
correct, or remedy any default or breach, to specifically enforce any covenants or
agreements set forth in the Agreement or to enjoin any threatened or attempted
violation of the Agreement, or to obtain any remedies consistent with the purposes
of the Agreement.").
217. See id. at 4.
218. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 56-57.
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enforcement depends on who is bringing the action: a party to the
contract or a third party plaintiff. Usually breaches of the agreement
by the developer are discovered by the municipality's design review
comnittee during periodic reviews of the development's progress. 219
When the developer is found to be in noncompliance, the
municipality may terminate or modify the agreement. 220 A breach of
the agreement by the municipality, by adopting a new zoning
ordinance that "renders the approved development impermissible,"
can amount to an unconstitutional impairment of contract, the remedy
for which is an injunction preventing the municipality from enforcing
the new zoning ordinance. 22 1 A claim for impairment of contract
allows the developer to seek damages against the municipality. 222
Otherwise, the developer can seek relief under a claim of breach of
contract, which affords the developer common law remedies
available for breach including damages, restitution, and specific
performance.223 In the case of a claim of breach of contract, the
municipality can avoid penalties for nonperformance if they can
establish that the noncompliance serves the public health, safety or
welfare; 224 but cannot avoid liability on public health reasons if the
relief sought is based on a claim of unconstitutional impairment of
contract.225 Courts that have had to deal with the municipality's
breach by adopting changes to the zoning rules "have no difficulty"
finding that the new rules do not apply to the property subject to the
agreement. 226
In Mfammoth Lakes, the developer and the town entered into a
development agreement, which provided, in part, for the developer's
right to build a hotel and condominium complex with an
accompanying option to purchase the hotel.22 7 When the town
refused to approve the developer's hotel plans, the developer sought
219. Schwartz, supra note 165, at 744.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 746.
222. Id. at 752 (citing Interview with Jon Witten, Adjunct Professor of Land Use
Planning, Boston College Law School (May 16, 2000)).
223. Id.; Wegner, supra note 191, at 1035.
224. Schwartz, supra note 165, at 746.
225. See id.; Wegner, supra note 191, at 1037.
226. CALLIES ET AL., supra note 187, at 109.

227. Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Town of Mammoth Lakes,
191 Cal. App. 4th 435, 440 (2010).
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damages, specific performance, injunctive relief and declaratory
relief.228 The jury awarded the developers $30 million for the tovn's
breach of the development agreement.229 On appeal, the town argued
that the developer had failed to exhaust the administrative and
judicial remedies available.2 30 Specifically, the town argued that the
remedy for its failure to approve the developer's conditional use
permit was an administrative mandamus; thus, a complaint in court
was inappropriate.231 According to the doctrine of "exhaustion of
administrative remedies," if an administrative remedy is provided by
statute, that remedial process must be exhausted before the courts
will act.2 32 It is well settled that if an administrative remedy is
provided, exhaustion of that remedy is required as a prerequisite to
access to the courts. 233
If, however, there is no available
administrative remedy, there is no prerequisite for first completing
the administrative process.234 In lannoth Lakes, the only remedy
that would have been available through the administrative process
was a vrit vacating the final decision of the town in their denial of
the developer's use permit.235 Damages would not have been an
available remedy via the administrative process. Since the developer
had given the town notice of default and the town failed to cure the
default, the issue for resolution was no longer the denial of a land use
application but a contractual default.
In Queen Anne 's County, a developer entered into a development
agreement with the County Commissioners of Queen Anne's
County. 236 Third party plaintiffs filed a complaint naming both the
developer and the county commissioners as defendants alleging that
the development agreement was invalid.2 37 The defendants filed a
228. Id. at 452.
229. Id. at 453.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 454.
232. Id.
233. Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal, 17 Cal. 2d 280, 292 (1941); Mammoth
Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 454.
234. Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 454; Tahoe Vista Concerned Citizens
v. County of Placer, 81 Cal.App.4th 577, 590 (2000).
235. Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 455.
236. Queen Anne's Conservation, Inc v. County Com'rs of Queen Anne's Cnty.,
855 A.2d 325, 327 (2004).
237. Id. at 327.
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motion to dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust
all available remedies, specifically the statutory procedure for
appeals of administrative decisions to the Board of Appeals for
Queen Anie's County.238 The development agreement in question
was the subject of multiple public hearings during the review and
adoption process and was ultimately approved by the local governing
agency. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a complaint for declaratory
and injunctive relief claiming, in part, that the development
agreement was illegal contract zoning and that the development
agreement as finally adopted contained revisions that were not part of
the public hearing process. 23 9 Pursuant to applicable law, the Board
of Appeals was to hear and decide appeals where it was alleged that
the order, requirement, decision or determination made by the officer
was in error. The court held that the approval of the development
agreement was done by the county commissioners acting collectively
as an administrative officer and as such made the appeals process
available to the plaintiffs. 24 0 This result was contrary to the process
that provided for the circuit court's immediate judicial review of a
zoning action by a municipality. The circuit court found that the
entry of the development agreement was done administratively as a
"public principal" and not as a "local legislative body."241 The
plaintiffs argued that when the county commissioners decided upon
the terms of the development agreement, they were exercising a
fundamental legislative task, and thus acting as a local municipality
as opposed to an administrative one.242 Determining to the contrary,
the court held that when a local governmental body enters into a
contract, it is a purely discretionary executive act and not a legislative
one.
A development agreement "is not an ordinance or
legislation . . . rather, it is a contract whose purpose is to vest rights
under zoning laws . . . ."243 The test for distinguishing between a

legislative act and an administrative act is whether the act makes a
new law or only "facilitates the administration, execution or

238. See id. at 327-28.
239. See id. at 332.
240. See id. at 333.
241. See id.

242. See id. at 334.
243. See id.
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implementation of a law already in force and effect." 244 Because the
plaintiffs failed to appeal the commissioners' administrative act of
entering into the development agreement, thus exhausting all its
administrative remedies, the complaint was rightfully dismissed.
Benefits and Burdens of Development Agreements
There are benefits to both the developer and the municipality to
entering into a development agreement. The municipality can extract
agreements from the developer to fund public projects and
improvements without meeting the requirements for regulatory
takings. 245
Additionally, the municipality can partner with
developers to reach their comprehensive and long-range planning

goals. 2 46
The developer will know going into the project the degree to which
it will be held responsible for financing public projectS247 and will
have an easier time finding affordable financing because the risk of
non-approval of the project has been significantly reduced. 248 That
said, the general parameters of the interests and projects sought
should be communicated early in the negotiations to avoid surprises
on either side after months of dialogue. 249 However, the specific
details and scope of the parameters should remain confidential during
the negotiations to ensure competent bargaining power.25 0
Another benefit a development agreement affords project
proponents is securing the applicable regulatory rules that will affect
the project.251 Without a development agreement, the municipality
retains the right to change the rules relating to a project, so long as
the change occurs before the construction rights have vested. 252 The
244. Id. at 337 (citing City of Bowie v. County Comm'rs for Prince George's
County, 258 Md. 454, 463 (1970)).
245. See INSTITUTE FOR LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 17.

246. See Green supra note 60, at 394.
247. See INSTITUTE FOR LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 17.

248. See Green supra note 60, at 394.
249. See INSTITUTE FOR LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 18.

250. See id. at 26 (discussing that the need to retain a degree of confidentiality
over the parameters of the development agreement can be difficult to achieve in
light of the municipality's obligation to comply with open meeting laws).
251. See id. at 21.
252. See id.
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circumstances under which the developer's rights have vested (at
which time the developer may reasonably rely on the representations
and applicable regulations) varies depending on other state
statutes.253 Generally speaking, a developer's rights have vested
when all necessary permits have been obtained, there has been
substantial work completed in good faith reliance, and substantial
liabilities have been incurred based on this good faith reliance.254
Although some courts have held that even if the developer had
performed substantial work and incurred substantial liabilities on the
project, the right to complete the work did not vest until the
developer obtained the building permit. 255 The legislatively-enacted
development agreement allows municipalities and developers to
move away from the common law rules regarding vested rights.256
Although the development agreement fixes the rights of the
developer and the governing agency with respect to the rules that will
apply to the development,25 7 there are certain recognized
exceptions.258 The development agreement cannot circumvent newly
enacted laws affecting public health, safety, or welfare.259 Likewise,
a development agreement cannot allow uses within a zoning
253. See N.C.
GEN.
STAT.
§ 153A-344.1 (2011), available at
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us./EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML /BySection/Chapter
153A/GS 153A-344.1.html.
254. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 19 (figure
on Vested Rights); see also Mammoth Lakes Land Acquisition, L.L.C. v. Town of
Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th 435,443. But see Union County v. CGP, Inc.,
277 Ga. 349, 351 (2003) (finding that substantial expenditures made in good faith
reliance did not vest the rights of the developer where the building permit was
invalid). The general rule regarding substantial work in good faith reliance
requires that the land be changed by the work. Therefore, merely preparing or
clearly the land in anticipation of building in reliance on the permit is typically not
substantial enough. Demolition of buildings in reliance is also rarely substantial
reliance. Actual excavation of the site in order to prepare the foundation and
erecting buildings do qualify as substantial compliance required for vesting a
builder's rights in the zoning decisions. See 2 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., ET AL.,
RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING § 70:21 (4th ed. 2011).
255. See Mammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 443; see also Avco Cmty.
Developers, Inc. v. S. Coast Reg'1 Comm'n, 17 Cal.3d 785, 793 (1976).
256. See Aammoth Lakes, 191 Cal. App. 4th at 443.
257. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 20.
258. See Schwartz, supra note 165, at 731.
259. See id.
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boundary that are not otherwise permitted by the applicable zoning
ordinance without first amending the zoning ordinance or rezoning
the property. 260 The fact that a special exception to the zoning
ordinance is contained within a development agreement does not
overcome the obstacle presented by a special exception or
conditional use that would violate the zoning ordinance itself.26' The
protection of the development agreement "shell" cannot perfect a use
that cannot be obtained through the grant of a conditional or special
use pennit. To do so would violate the principal of uniformity
sought in the zoning schemes.
The authority to impose zoning rules is afforded local governments
through the state's delegation of their police powers articulated in
26
state statute.262
Although state law may impose minimum limitations
on zoning matters, it is the intent that local cities and counties
exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters. 263
For instance, state statute might impose a uniformity requirement on
zoning schemes. 264 The purpose of requiring uniformity within a
class has been articulated in contract principals:
A zoning scheme, after all, is similar in some respects to a
contract; each party foregoes rights to use its land as it wishes in
return for the assurance that the use of neighboring property will be
similarly restricted, the rationale being that such mutual restriction
can enhance total community welfare. 265
An ad hoc exception to a zoning scheme contained in a
development agreement violates the benefits and burdens afforded to
land owners through the expectations imposed by the zoning
scheme.26 6 Furthermore, it denies other landowners in the zoning
boundary the ability to seek similar treatment for their similarlysituated property. 267 It has been held that the development agreement
260. See Neighbors in Support of Appropriate Land Use v. County of Tuolumne,
157 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1001 (2007).
261. See id. at 1003.
262. See Lesley R. Attkisson, Putting a Stop to Sprawl: State Intervention as a
Toolfor Growth Management, 62 VAND. L. REV. 979, 981-82 (2009).
263. See Neighbors in Support, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 1006.
264. See id. at 1008-09.
265. See id. at 1009 (quoting Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Cmty. v. County of Los
Angeles, 11 Cal.3d 506, 517-518 (1974)).
266. See Neighbors in Support, 157 Cal. App. 4th at 1009.
267. See id. at 1009.
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laws do not provide relief from zoning restrictions by permitting ad
hoc uses that result in zoning "disuniformity" [sic] that the
municipality is otherwise unauthorized to make.268
There are also benefits afforded the public by use of a development
agreement insomuch as many of the development agreement
processes grant the public a right to input in the details. 269 In the
development agreement process, the public access usually comes by
way of a noticed public hearing. 270 The process might be best served,
however, by including the public in a more substantial way during
the development of the agreement instead of only an after-the-fact
response.2 7 1 By allowing public stakeholders a chance to air their
concerns as the project is being developed, the municipality and the
developer can re-evaluate the project as necessary to avoid strong
public opposition. 272 The challenge with allowing public input is that
the municipality and those negotiating on their behalf must keep the
negotiations confidential, which limits the degree to which the public
can be involved in an open dialogue. 273
There are a number of challenges to using a development
agreement effectively.
The municipality must ensure that the
concessions and compromises offered by the developer do not unduly
influence the municipality's overall planning policies.274 Since the
development agreement prohibits application of future regulatory
changes on the existing project, it is imperative that the municipality
identifies at the outset of the project all of the issues that the
municipality might seek to control.27 5 Otherwise, it would require
subsequent modifications to the development agreement to which the
developer may not agree.276 Not only must the municipality be
forward-thinking in their approach to the terms of the development
agreement, but the developer must also consider all the possible
outcomes and obstacles that might arise during the course of the
268. See id at 1014.
269. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 32 n.178.
270. See id at 32.

271. See id at 33.
272. See id

273. See id at 34.
274. See id at 14.
275. See id at 20-21.
276. See id at 21.
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development project, and ensure that the agreement provides
sufficient flexibility to address otherwise unforeseen market
conditions. 277 Because the development agreement is still subject to
revisions to state and federal regulations, the developer does not
acquire a risk-free platform on which to build, but does acquire some
protection from regulatory change. 278
One challenge associated with a development agreement is its
applicability to successors-in-interest to the contracting party. Many
development agreements provide that the contract terms are
covenants that run with the land, and thus the benefits and burdens
bind successors-in-interest of the property.2 79 While the agreement
may bind successors-in-interest, the likelihood of performance with a
non-contracting successor-in-interest is low.280 If there are multiple
successors-in-interest, the more removed the successor from the
contracting party, the less bound he or she may feel to the original
agreement. If a successor-in-interest does not have the same
financial stability as the original contracting party, the risk of breach
increases without additional protection provided to the municipality.
If a successor-in-interest files bankruptcy, the municipality may feel
unable or unwilling to pursue an action against the successor-ininterest in default. 281 Some of these challenges can be addressed in
the development agreement to provide assurances or prior approval
provisions on a pending sale of the property.28 2
Another protective measure to take when entering a development is
to ensure that all parties necessary to achieve the full performance of
the tenns of the development agreement are bound to it. As a
contract, the terms will only be binding on the contracting parties
(and possible third party beneficiaries), but if approval from other
governental agencies is required, they should be included as parties
to the contract. Otherwise, there may be no legal leverage to enforce
their performance necessary for the contracting parties to get their
benefit of the bargain. 283
277. See id.
278. See id.

279. See id. at 59.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
Green, supra note 60, at 396.
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In addition, the municipality must avoid the classification of its
entering into a development agreement as illegal contract zoning.
Contract zoning occurs when the landowner seeking a certain zoning
action and the zoning authority undertake "reciprocal obligations."284
Often, the nature of these obligations includes the governing body's
assurance that it will not alter the zoning classification of the area in
question for a period of time. Because the municipality is agreeing to
refrain from exercising its legislative authority, the contract zoning is
illegal as ultra vires.285 To establish this illegal contract zoning, the
landowner and the municipality must have a "meeting of the minds"
about the reciprocal assurances made to one another.
Contract zoning is also a concern to the extent that it contracts
away a municipality's police powers.
As noted above, the
management of the zoning ordinances is a police power afforded the
local governing body by the enabling statute. By contracting away
these police powers for the benefit of a landowner who stands to
benefit from the zoning action, the municipality runs the risk of the
courts finding that the municipality has engaged in the prohibited act
28
of contract zoning.286
If a development agreement freezes the
ordinances or other relevant land use regulations, it may amount to an
illegal surrendering of the municipality's police power.287 Avoiding
this outcome depends on the degree to which the municipality has
surrendered its control over land use decisions and might be avoided
if the municipality retains all of its powers except as the development
284. See Hall v. Durham, 323 N.C. 293, 298-99 (1988); see also McLean Hosp.
Corp. v. Town of Belmont, 56 Mass. App. Ct. 540, 545 (2002) (defining illegal
contract zoning as a "process by which a local government enters into an
agreement with a developer whereby the government extracts a performance or
promise from the developer in exchange for its agreement to rezone the property"
(citing 3 RATHKOPF, ZONING & PLANNING

§ 44:11 (Ziegler rev. ed. 2001)).

285. See Hall, 323 N.C. at 298. An ultra vires act or contract is one into which
the municipality has no authority to enter under any circumstances or for any
purpose. Further, it is an act or contract by the municipality that cannot be
subsequently ratified by the governing body. See 10 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF

MUN. CORPS. § 29:14 (3rd ed. 2011).
286. See Mclean Hosp. Corp., 56 Mass. App. Ct. at 545.
287. See CALLIES ET. AL., supra note 187, at 92; see also INSTITUTE FOR
LocAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 54. See generally Santa Margarita

Area Residents Together v. San Luis Obispo Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 84 Cal.
App. 4th 221 (2000) (finding that the municipality did not contract away their
police powers).
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agreement may otherwise provide. 288 In determining whether there
has been an illegal surrender of police powers, the court will make
two inquiries: 1) did the municipality make its zoning decision based
upon "its own assessment of what best serves the public health,
safety, and welfare" 289 and 2) did the municipality "surrender all
power to act in the future to protect the public health, safety, and
welfare." 290 The prevailing view is that as long as the municipality
reserves some power to control the development in the agreement,
there has not been an illegal contracting away of the police powers.291
Also of importance is the length of time for which the municipality
has agreed to freeze the zoning. Courts appear to object when the
police power has been bargained away forever or for a particularly
long time. 2 92 Alternatively, state law could provide that the
development agreement will not prevent the municipality from
applying new policies, regulations or rules to the property. 293
Development agreements may run afoul of the prohibition against
contract zoning if not drafted carefully, and a similar concern has
been raised with respect to conditional zoning. Despite a general
prohibition against contract zoning, conditional zoning has been
upheld where the municipality bargains for certain conditions from
the landowner in exchange for certain zoning changes. 294
Understanding the distinctions between contract and conditional
zoning is necessary to achieve the desirable benefits of the latter
while avoiding the negative implications of the former, but courts
288. See INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT, supra note 169, at 54; see

also Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 733
(1976).
289. Green, supra note 60, at 409; Alderman v. Chatham Cnty., 89 N.C. App.
610, 618 (1988).
290. Green, supra note 60, at 409.
291. See CALLIES ET AL.., supra note 187, at 93; see also Morrison Homes Corp.

v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724, 734 (1976).
292. See Callies et al., supra note 187, at 93 (noting that the main question of
time usually turns on the ability of one council to bind its successors); Morrison
Homes Corp., 58 Cal. App. at 735 n.8 (noting that with regard to the length of time
it "may constitute a finding of ultimate fact.").
293. See Callies et al., supra note 187, at 91; see also City of Pasadena, CAL.
CODE § 17.66.090(B) (2011), available at http://ww2.cityofpasadena.net/zoning/P6.html#17.66.090.
294. See Green, supra note 60, at 459; see also Ryan, supra note 171, at 356.
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have struggled with properly identifying these two distinct
concepts.2 9 5 Conditional zoning, like contract zoning, involves the
rezoning of a parcel of land but is done subject to conditions imposed
on the landowner as opposed to a result of reciprocal promises. 296 In
conditional zoning, the municipality makes no promises to the
landowner that the rezoning will occur but, in fact, adopts the
rezoning upon the "imposition of conditions, covenants, and
restrictions" on the landowner.2 9 7 Conditional zoning avoids the
reciprocal agreement problem associated with contract zoning
because it is only the landowner making promises (a unilateral
agreement) and any subsequent rezoning is based on an independent
assessment of the public's interest. 298
There are several benefits to the use of a development agreement to
address the emergence of a mixed used development among existing
homeowners.
The greatest deficiency is the absence of the
homeowner's voice at the bargaining table. While enabling statutes
require the development agreement to be discussed at public
hearings, the opportunity for feedback in that venue is less
meaningful than the degree of public input permitted when the
homeowners have a seat at the bargaining table. 2 99 Likewise, a
private landowner must acknowledge that the municipality, in the
course of negotiating the development, must be concerned with the
common welfare of the entire municipality and cannot limit its
agenda to the interests of the surrounding neighbors.
IV. MOVING FORWARD

A review of these three zoning tools illustrates how each tool,
individually, can successfully meet one or more goals of the
295. See Green, supra note 60, at 444-45 (describing how the unilateral/bilateral
distinction has often been overlooked by the courts, and much of the confusion in
the cases can be attributed to the failure of courts to properly define the two
concepts); see also Knoxville v. Ambrister, 196 Tenn. 1, 5-7 (1953).
296. See Green, supra note 60, at 406 (citing KENNETH H. YOUNG, ANDERSON'S
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 9.20 (4th ed. 1996)).

297. Id.
298. Id. at 407.
299. See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A
Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvem ent and Adaptive
Planning in Land Use Decisions, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269, 274-76 (2005).
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developer, the municipality, or the surrounding neighborhood, but
individually, each fails to create a mechanism that can
simultaneously meet the needs of all of these stakeholders. With
respect to protecting the developer's right to build a mixed use
development over time without fear of changing zoning rules, the
best tool to use is a development agreement that effectively freezes
the zoning rules for the developer during the construction phase. In
terms of protecting existing, surrounding homeowners from the harsh
realities of new development and redevelopment the most effective
of the three tools is an NCD.
Existing restrictive covenants
applicable to the surrounding neighborhood will fail to bind the
developer because the developer's underlying property is not subject
to the restrictions and an attempt to initiate restrictive covenants will
fail unless the developer willingly agrees to be bound. Likewise,
development agreements negotiated between the municipality and the
developer might include protections for the existing neighborhood
but the interests of the neighbors are secondary to those of the
developer and the municipality. If, in addition to protections against
infill development or redevelopment, existing neighbors also wish to
protect themselves against one another in the absence of existing
restrictive covenants, the best tools are private covenants or an NCD,
which will address issues of tear-downs, setbacks, and additions; a
development agreement will not be useful in addressing neighbor-toneighbor concerns.
In terms of promoting mixed use development adjacent to existing
neighborhoods, the best tool would be a development agreement that
specifically addresses the promises and expectations by the developer
and municipality with respect to accepted uses. But the development
agreement fails to adequately provide for public input and buy-in.
An NCD is not an effective tool because of the myriad of rules
necessary to address the varied uses within the mixed use
development. Preserving the opportunity for public input is most
supported through the NCD process, especially those processes that
are committee-based; public input is only minimally protected
through the negotiation of a development agreement. Enforceability
is easiest within the context of restrictive covenants, which impose
fines and other penalties on the breaching owner, and development
agreements which embrace contract remedies for breach:
enforceability is most difficult within the zoning realm because of the
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lack of resources and municipal momentum for enforcement.
Binding future homeowners to the adopted restrictions and
limitations is most easily done through the restrictive covenants that
by their very nature run with the land and, thereafter, are achieved
through the NCD zoning overlay applicable to homeowners within
the overlay district.
Binding future homeowners is virtually
impossible in the context of a development agreement between the
developer and the town.
In light of the deficiencies of these three tools in addressing the
influx of mixed use developments in and around existing, healthy
neighborhoods, a new Community Design & Preservation Agreement
(CDPA) model should be adopted. A CDPA would weave together
the strengths of all of these land use tools to address the conflicting
interests of homeowner, developer, and municipality alike. The
parties to the CDPA would be the developer, the municipality, and
representatives of the community stakeholders. The participation of
the developer and municipality would bind them to the terms of the
CDPA and the participation of representatives of the community
stakeholders will serve to bind the existing homeowners living in
proximity to the proposed development. Borrowing from the NCD
model, the CDPA could be initiated by the developer, the
municipality, or a petition by a majority of the surrounding
landowners. The surrounding landowners would participate in the
CDPA if the CDPA is initiated by their own petition. Likewise, if
the CDPA process is initiated by a developer or municipality, a
majority of the homeowners could consent to participate as
respondents in the petition. In the event that there is not sufficient
homeowner support to initiate a petition or consent to participate as a
respondent to a developer or municipality-initiated process, the
developer and municipality would proceed under a traditional
development agreement process. If, however, there is sufficient
support from surrounding landowners, the three stakeholder groups
(developer, municipality, and landowners) would form a
representative committee to negotiate the CDPA terms. Continuing
to borrow from the NCD model, the boundary of the Community
Design & Preservation area would be determined to minimally
encompass the land subject to the mixed use development as well as
the surrounding homeowners most likely to be affected by the mixed
use. Representatives of the three stakeholder groups would work to
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create design guidelines that adequately address concerns of
homeowners amongst each other, as well as concerns of homeowners
about the mixed use development.
Because the municipality is a party to the agreement, the
negotiations would be subject to open meeting laws and public
hearings to get input from the community at large, while the
representative homeowners serving on the committee will have a
voice at the negotiating table. The terms of the CDPA would include
the ability to freeze the zoning regulations that would apply to the
project, design guidelines for the new mixed use development, and
design guidelines for existing homeowners. Design guidelines would
identify setbacks, height requirements, roof pitches, impervious
surface requirements, land uses, green space requirements and related
issues. The various design guidelines required to address the diverse
design schemes present in a MUD can be addressed more efficiently
in a CDPA than in an NCD: in a CDPA, the contracting parties can
delineate the design guidelines for each specific area of the new
development. In an NCD, the zoning overlay district clumsily
attempts to address the various design guidelines necessary to meet
the needs of a MUD in one conservation district, resulting in a
patchwork solution that is cumbersome and difficult to enforce. To
avoid the claim that the municipality has contracted away its police
powers by entry into the CDPA, there must be a term limitation
placed on the freezing of the zoning regulations. Thus, the CDPA
should provide that the zoning regulations will be frozen for such
period of time as necessary for completion of the development
construction and no longer. The other terms of the CDPA need not
expire at the same time and, in fact, borrowing from the restrictive
covenant arena, the remaining terms of the agreement would continue
in effect indefinitely, binding successors-in-interest. A copy of the
CDPA would be filed with the register of deeds in the county in
which the property in question is located and would serve as notice to
future purchasers in the CDPA boundary that the home is subject to
the terms of the CDPA. Because all homeowners in the CDPA
boundary, as well as all future property owners in the mixed use
development, would be subject to the CDPA, the agreement should
make it clear that every landowner and his successor-in-interest is a
third party beneficiary of the CDPA and has the authority to sue on
its terms.
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For purposes of enforcement, the CDPA model would look to the
development agreement and restrictive covenant approach and
provide for contract remedies within the terns of the CDPA,
including, but not limited to specific performance, fines, and other
pecuniary damages and attorneys' fees (forfeiture is rarely an
approved damage in cases of zoning violations). The municipality or
other homeowners residing in the CDPA boundary could enforce the
terms of the CDPA against a breaching developer. Likewise, the
municipality, other homeowners or the developer could enforce the
contract terms against another breaching homeowner. Primarily, this
approach removes the enforcement from the hands of the
municipality, which may not have the will or resources to pursue an
action in enforcement.

CONCLUSION
Mixed use developments are an increasing part of our development
landscape, as towns and cities grapple with the challenges of urban
sprawl and the associated environmental implications. As these
communities embrace the standards of smart growth and new
urbanism movements, we will see a proliferation of new MUD.
Current land use tools do not adequately protect the private
homeowner faced with his new mixed use neighbor. Adopting a
Community Design and Preservation Agreement model will allow
the continued evolution of land use regulations to provide a direct
opportunity for homeowner voice in the negotiations with the
municipality and their mixed use neighbors, increase community
accord, reduce community pushback, and provide efficient and
broad-based enforcement techniques for all involved parties.

